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on young,
disclosed
For the foregoing reasons I would
the
of law for the
of one year.

from

Petitioners' application for a
was denied June 6,
1956, and the time for commencement of their suspension was
extended to commence Angnst 15, 1956. Carter, ,J., was of
the opinion that the petition should be

[L. A. No. 23976.

In Bank.
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CESAR LAMBRETON, Petitioner, v. INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT COMMISSION et
[1] Negligence- Serious and Wilful Misconduct.- Serious and

wilful misconduct means
different from and much
more than negligence, however gross; such misconduct is
basically the antithesis of negligence, and the two types of
behavior are mutually exclusive.
[2a, 2b] Workmen's Compensation-Time to Make Claim-Effect
of Amendment.-A workmen's compensation claim expressly
stating that "the employer was grossly negligent" cannot serve
as the basis for a later "amendment" setting forth a charge
of serious and wilful misconduct which would
an entirely new and different
on the
where,
at no time within 12 months from the date of
was it
See Cal.Jur., Negligence, §
[2] See Cal.Jur., Workmen's
Workmen's
§ 489.
McK. Dig. References:
Compensation, § 146;

Workmen's
§ 123.

tJ99

in "proceedings"
date of injury"
of the aggravated
which constitutes serious
which the employer cannot
which he must himself defend.

reason of serious and
are cumulative rather than
and are at least as different in essential
facts and
as are negligence and serious
wilful misconduct.

PHOCEEDING to review an order of the Industrial Accident Commission dismissing petitioner's claim for additional
Order affirmed.

·unl''""'""'

Echmrd A. Sarkisian, Daniels, Elson &
&
and Milton H. Silverberg for

incompensation, or action at
16 A.L.R. 620; 58
A.L.R 1379; 68 A.L.R. 301. See also Cal.Jur., Workmen's Com,.~.Nuvwu, § 116; Am.Jur., Workmen's Compensation, § 199.

that "The period within which may
for the collection of compensation
serious and wilful misconduct of the emof section 4553, is as follows:
'l'welve months from the date of injury. This period
shall not be extended
. . . the filing of application for
benefits under other provisions of this division."
Petitioner was
on June 10, 1953. On July 13,
he filed
his attorney an application for combenefits on a printed form furnished by the commission and entitled "Application for Adjustment of Claim."
After the
words alleging that petitioner ''sustained
out of and in the course of the employment,
as follows : '' the following was filled in : ''Punch press broke
so that it punched twice in rapid succession," resulting in
to
's right hand. The line starting with the
words '' The reason for filing this claim is :'' was
filled in: "Partial disability of claimant. Claimant alleges
that
was grossly negligent in maintenance of the
press.''
VC,;vULU''"

The commission gave the parties notice of hearing for September
which stated no issue of serious and wilful
misconduct of the
but by stipulation of the parties
the matter was taken off calendar to be reset at the request
c1f either
On October 22, 1954, petitioner filed a
substitution of
On December 17, 1954, the new
filed on petitioner's behalf a document entitled
'' AMK~DJ\rEKT
Interlineation) '' in which it was stated
of the allegation that ''Claimant alleges that
was
negligent in maintenance of the press,
. . . claimant alleges as follows :'' That on the date of
injury, June 10, 1953, the employer "Bowers Mfg. Company
operated and maintained a certain punch press in its place
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for in eases where an
serious and wilful
the employer and on
4,
the nr<)ee.eawc"''"'u'"" based on the asserted misconduct was ordered

-.,-y~·~-··v has recovered and is now
resume work and does not suffer from any peJrman1mt
" At a
in
the
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stated the sole issue was
, ' and counsel for
's counsel
to elicit evidence
"That is not in issue. If you
shoring up the referee
want to raise the
you will have to do it.''
''
I think we
should raise that'' ; the
referee then
''Additional Issue
the
caused
serious and willful misconduct
and counsel for the
stated that he would file a suppleforth the basis on which misconduct
was
reference to certain safety
orders. No supplemental
was filed, and after
several continuances the matter was ordered off calendar in
1942. In 1946 it was again noticed for
a "new"
application was seemingly filed, an order was made that "the
application will be considered as an amended application,''
an additional issue of ''statute of limitations'' was stated,
and a hearing was had on all issues, including serious and
wilful misconduct. Normal benefits were thereupon awarded,
as well as an increased benefit based on the asserted misconduct. On the
for review the award
of an increased benefit was annulled on the ground that,
liberality in the
although "there is, and should be,
matter of amendments this amendment in 1946, bringing in
a new and different issue which must be separately 'commenced,' could not relate back and be effective as of a date
in 1941, in the face of the clear
of section 5407 of
the Labor Code. While considerable informality in proceedings before the commission is permitted, and properly so,
the meaning and effect of these statutory provisions cannot
be entirely set aside, and some attempt must be made to
comply with them and to raise issues in the manner and
within the time there provided.'' (Pp. 359-360 of 81 Cal.
App.2d.)
In the Peterson case it would have been more nearly justithe so-called amendfiable than in the present one to
ment stating misconduct, to relate back to the original date
of filing the claim, inasmuch as there the employer was on
specific notice within 12 months from the date of injury
that the
intended to claim serious and wilful misconduct. In the present case,
the
claim
not only did not state that serious and wilful misconduct
stated that the ''employer was
was claimed but it
grossly negligent in maintenance of the press." [1] As
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gross ; such
and the
are
exclusive. [2a] It folvul;\uJ.<u claim could not serve as the basis for
""'''""''"' forth a
of serious and
would impose an entirely new and
liability on the employer. At no time within
YYlnnu•" from the date of injury was it even suggested in
that such a
would be made.
in reliance upon W ennerholm v.
of Medicine (1942), 20 Cal.2d
141 A.L.R 1358], (see also LeOyr v. Dow,
462-463 [86 P.2d 900]), urges
is indulged in by the courts in permitting
am;onl.tillt:lll'"• and no reason appears why a proceeding before
Industrial Accident Commission should be more techniIn the W ennerholm ease the following appears : ''The
of
demurrer principally urged by the defendthat the cause
action is barred by the statute of
This contention is based on the theory that the
amended
charging fraud states a new and
.rliffer,ent cause of action from that for negligence stated in
complaint. Unless the amended complaint sets
an entirely different rouse
action from the original,
t"'""""'"".,. the amended complaint, for the purposes of the
'l>ta~tu:te of
must be deemed filed as of the date
complaint. [Citations.] The modern rule,
Glll."'ll'"'="u" is sought after the statute of limitations
is that the amended complaint will be deemed filed
date of the original complaint so long as recovery
in each
upon the same general set of facts.
A mere
· in legal tkeory will not subject
cmnu.taun to the bar of the statute of limitations.
In the
case the only substantial differbetween the factual situations set forth in the original and
fifth amended complaint is that the former charged that
were negligently made while the latter
~--~,-,.,,~~that they were made with knowledge of their falsity.
ho,wm;rf\1'

~Lvj>;Uj>;vJ.LvV;

[46 C.2d

nr,ocf~PfiJn['" before the Industrial Accia claim for normal benefits and a claim for
benefits by reason of serious and wilful misconduct
upon the same general set of facts, nor do
a difference or change in legal theory.
is not the same; the legal liability is not
the same and the "proceedings" to recover the benefits as
are recognized as being different. (Lab.
[4a] Normal benefits automatically follow
from an
within a covered employment relationship,
whereas the additional award based on serious and wilful
misconduct of the employer is an additional award which,
denominated and regarded for administrative purposes as ''increased compensation,' ' 1 is actually of the nature
of a penalty, which is imposed only in "proceedings" commenced within '"fwelvc months from the date of injury"
(Lab.
§ 5407), and only upon proof of the aggravated
criminal or quasi-criminal behavior which constitutes serious
and wilful misconduct, and against which the employer cannot
insurance. (1Jfe1·cer-Fraser Co. v. Industrial
Ace. 0 om. ( 1953), sttpm, 40 Cal.2d 102, 108, 121, and authorities there cited; Ins. Code, § 11661.) [5] Thus the two
types of benefits are cumulative, rather than merely alternaand are at least as different in essential supporting facts
and
theory as are negligence and serious and wilful
misconduct. As pointed out in Frost v. Witter (1901), 132
Cal.
426 [64 P. 705, 84 Am.St.Rep. 53], "for the purpose
of
whether amendment is possible, the 'cause of
action' referred to as furnishing the test means only the legal
obligation which it is sought to enforce against the defendant."
(Klopgtock v.
Court (1941), 17 Oal.2d 13, 20 [108
P.2d 906, 135 A.L.R. 318].) [2b] Here, as shown above, the
1

Such

was deemed necessary in order to sustain jurisdiction
Accident Commission to make the additional award.
(E. Clemens Horst Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com. (1920), 184 Cal. 180,
192-193 [193 P. 105, 16 A.L.R. 611}.)

in the

L.AMBBETON

v.

INDUSTRIAL

Aoo.

[46 C.2d 498; 29'7 P.2d 91

CoM.

505

to pay normal benefits is one obligation, while
to pay additional compensation by reason of serious
wilful misconduct is an entirely distinct and further
From what has been said, it follows that a claim
alleging gross negligence not only does not conthe commencement of proceedings to collect additional
co:ro:pE~nsltticm based on the statutorily defined misconduct of
but implicitly negatives existence of a basis
proceedings. Hence, the commission, bound by the
as are we, correctly held that the misconduct issue
was raised too late.
[4b] The employer points out, further, that under the
""'''vil<1mls of sections 3756 through 3759 of the Labor Code
also Ins. Code, § 11662) 2 the insurer will be substituted
of the employer and the latter dismissed, in proceedfor normal benefits, whereas the employer must himself
·ut:.Lc.u.u. against a claim for extra benefits based on his alleged
misconduct, against which, as already mentioned herein, he
cannot insure. The legal liabilities or obligations for the two
of benefits are thus again shown to be essentially differ( See KZopstock v. S1tperior Court (1941), s'!tpra, 17 Cal.
20.)
reason of our conclusion that the commission correctly
um·LU""'c"'u. the proceeding for additional compensation on the
rrPrmn.rl of serious and wilful misconduct because the so-called
was filed more than 12 months from the date
of injury, no useful purpose would be served by discussing
points raised by the employer.
The order of dismissal is affirmed.
UUUp:;CW>.V»

J., Traynor, J., Spence, J., and McComb, J., conCARTER, J.-I dissent.
The majority opinion applies technical rules of pleading
a situation where such rules are clearly inapplicable, and
"Insurance Code, section 11662: "Whenever any employer :is :insured
against liability for compensation with any insurer, sueh insurer is subrogated to the rights of the employer to recover losses arising out of
of the following aets by the insurer:
Assuming the liability of the employer for eompensation :in
the manner provided by the law relating thereto.
''
Payment of any compensation for which the employer is liable.
''Such insurer may enforce any sueh subrogated rights :in its own

name.''

C.2d

for a compensable
to the facts justifying
was grossly neglipress which resulted
amendment in "\Yhich he
in detail; the amendfrom the date of
4553 of tl1e I-1abor Code. In my
not necessary to raise the issue
of wilful misconduct as such issue was
in the language
tontained in the
The only purpose the
amendment served was to
particularize the misconduct. Hence the time of
the amendment is
holds tl1at the statement in the original application was not sufficient to raise the wilful misconduct issue
and that thus the amendment stated a new cause of action
which was barred
section 4553.
Section 5500 of the Labor Code provides that: "The application shall be in
and shall state the general nature
of any controversy concerning compensation or any right or
liability arising out of or incidental thereto and over which
jnrisdiction is vrsted
law in the commission.'' The rules
of the commission state that a charge of wilful misconduct
should be
with some particularity but the only sanction for the failure to so state the case is that it is grounds
Admin. Code, tit. 8, § 10700.) The
workmen's
laws must be liberally construed
with the purpose of extending the benefits for the protection
of persons
in the conrse of their employment. (Lab.
Code, § 3202.) The
in workmen's compensation
proceedings are to be
construed and need not adhere
to rnles of
in ordinary court procedure.
(DeMartini v. Industrial Ace.
90 Cal.App.2d 139, 148
[202 P.2d
.)
Here we have the
that the press was grossly
negligmtly maintaineil. rrhat was sufficient to advise the
hili carrier that more than ordinary compensacompensation is recoverable regardtion was
less of fault of the
or employee. (Cal. Const., art.
XX, § 21; I1ab.
§ 3600.) Hence petitioner's allegation

rI

to WcnCal.2cl 713
new
an amendment which
action where the
that
\Yere
Inade; that therefore the
the amended
siawte of limitations lwd not run
was filed after the limitation
Here a change
of gros::;
in the maintenance of the
pn''"' to vvilful misconduct in the maintcnauec of the press
llcws not constitute stai ing a new eause of action.
opinion of the Distriet Comt of
Seeoud Distriet. Division Three,
l\Ir. ,Jnstiec
pro
tempore, ably disposes of this case
I
of
di:ssent as follows
"Petitioner challrnges as excess
of
Industrial Aceident Commission to consider his
claim to increased compensation for an industrial accident
basr•d uvon an
of
allJ wilful misconduct of
the
'!'hat is the only
in the case. Employer
and employee are within the \Vorkmen 's
Act,
the
was a compensable one, and the normal compensation due petitioner has been
without
to
the daim now before us.
"Petitioner received an
his hand on June 10,
filed an application for
of his claim on ,T uly
13,
and an amendment thereto on December 17, 1H54.
'rlw application was made upon a
form providerl by
the commission. At the line
with 'Bxplain How
\Vas Heceived' it says 'Punch press broke so that it

L
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uu•~uvu twice in rapid succession.' And paragraph 11, 'The
reason for filing this claim is:' was filled in as follows: 'Partial
permanent disability of claimant. Claimant alleges that
employer was grossly negligent in maintenance of the press.'
The printed prayer reads: 'Wherefore, It is requested that
a time and place be fixed for hearing and notice given, and
that an order or award be made granting such relief as the
party or parties may be entitled to.' Hearing was set for
September 21, 1953, and later taken off calendar by stipulation. On December 17, 1954, petitioner filed a document
entitled 'Amendment (By Interlineation)' which reads as
follows: 'Whereas serious and wilful misconduct has been
alleged by claimant in his application for adjustment filed
with the above commission, July 9th, 1953, and it is claimant's
desire to amend said allegation with regard to serious and
wilful misconduct, and in said application it is set forth as
follows: ''Claimant alleges that employer was grossly negligent in maintenance of the press,'' that in the place and
stead of said allegation claimant alleges as follows: L That
on or about June lOth, 1953, the respondent Bowers Mfg.
Company operated and maintained a certain punch press in
its place of manufacturing in violation of section 3601 (b)
Title 8, of the California Adminisgration Code, in thay all
points of operation guards were not properly set up, adjusted
or maintained in safe and efficient working order. II. That
as a proximate result of said serious and wilful misconduct of
said respondant, the claimant, Cesar Lambreton while working within the course and scope of his employment, suffered
personal injuries and damage of a permanant nature, to-wit:
Loss of part of middle finger right hand and paralysis of index
finger of right hand. WHEREFORE IT IS PRAYED that in addition to his award, that respondants be assessed extradordinary
damages for serious and wilful misconduct.' As this filing was
more than one year after date of injury the commission held
that the claim of serious and wilful misconduct of the employer was barred by Labor Code, section 5407 and dismissed
the .same.
''Section 4553 Labor Code provides: 'The amount of compensation otherwise recoverable shall be increased one-half
where the employee is injured by reason of the serious and
wilful misconduct of any of the following: (a) The employer,
or his managing representative. . . . But such increase of
award shall in no event exceed three thousand seven hundred
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dollars ( $3,750).' And section 5407: 'The period
which may be commenced proceedings for the collection of compensation on the ground of serious and wilful
of the employer, under provisions of section 4553,
is
follows:
Twelve months from the date of injury.
This period shall not be extended by payment of compensation,
therefor, or the filing of application for compensation benefits under other provisions of this division.'
"The theory of the commission and of the employer, as
is that a charge of gross negligence is the antiof serious and wilful misconduct and hence the amendment of December 17, 1954, was the first charge of such misand, being filed more than a year after the accident,
came too late. Petitioner's counsel take the position that the
said document was but an amendment of a defective but
amendable allegation in the original application and that it
tlwrrfore dates back to the time of original filing on July 13,
J 953. Respondents do not challenge the applicability to compensation proceedings of this doctrine of relation; they merely
take the position that there was no basis for an amendment
and hence no room for application of the relation rule. This
case thus reduces itself to a question of whether we deal
with a mere variance or a complete departure in pleading.
"'l'here are certain rules relating to court actions which
the way to a correct decision here. And it must be
as a mere truism that proceedings before the commission are attended by less, not more, formality than those
in conrt of law. Sections 5708 and 5709, Labor Code, so
declare in substance.
"Hespondents rely primarily on lJ!ercer-Fraser Co. v. Indusln'al Ace. Com., 40 Cal.2d 102 [251 P.2d 955], a case in
which an award of increased compensation for serious and
wilful misconduct was annulled for insufficiency of the eviwhich showed negligence and fell short of proof of such
misconduct. In so doing the court discussed the difference
between negligence and wilful misconduct, saying at page
120: 'Rather, the true rule is that serious and wilful misconduct is basically the antithesis of negligence, and that the
two
of behavior are mutually exclusive; an act which is
negligent and consequently devoid of either an intention to do harm or of knowledge or appreciation of the fact
that danger is likely to result therefrom cannot at the same
time constitute wilful misconduct; conversely an act de lib-
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express purpose of injuring another, or
either with knowledge that serious
result or with a positive, active, wanton,
of its possibly damaging
reckless and absolute
consequences, cannot
be classed as the less culpable
It follows that a finding
conduct which termed
wilful misconduct cannot be sustained upon
It also quoted from
of
, Cal.2d
P.2d 194], as follows:
' "'While the line between gross negligence and wilful misbe easy to draw, a distinction appears
conduct may not
is merely such a lack of care
. . . in that gross
to indicate a passive and indifferent attias may be
tude towards
while wilful misconduct involves a more
""'"'..-'"'" intent actually to harm another or to do an act with
a
active and absolute disregard of its consequences.'' '
This Mercer-Fraser case involved no problem of amendment
and, so far as here applicable, holds only that gross negligence
is not the equivalent of serious and wilful misconduct. Ours
is a different question, whether a charge of gross negligence
affords basis for an amendment to allege wilful misconduct
under the circumstances presented by the record at bar.
"It must be recognized that section 4553, in providing increased compensation for wilful misconduct, does not create
a separate cause of action or claim. This was determined
by E. Clemens Horst Co. v. Industrial Ace. Corn., 184 Cal.
180 [193 P. 105, 16 A.L.R. 611]. The constitutionality of
the Compensation Act was there challenged and it was
claimed that the provision for such additional award was
unconstitutional because the Constitution empowered the Legislature to do no more than provide for 'compensation' for
and that the addition of a penalty for
wilful misconduct was not embraced by that term. At page
192 the court said: 'This language does not authorize the
creation of a liability for anything more than compensation.
If the fifty per cent to be added in cases where the injury
is caused
the willful misconduct of the employer is given
as a penalty for such misconduct, and not as compensation to
the
for his
, the provision is not within the
said section, and if it has
to the
hP,rrm,r~ the legislative power and void.'
to be presumed the legislature
by loss of earnings and other

ll

of 1 claim may be so increased.
''Cases dealing with amendments
tht· correct answer. Great
is
of amendment to the end that lawsuits
upon their merits.
J
[108 P.2d 906, 1~13
10:?. CaL 421, 424 [ G4 P.
128 Cal.App.2cl
Jfirschhorn, 112 CaLApp.
the solution of every problem of whether a new cause of acti011
Jws been inserted
amendment after the
of the
statnte of limitation must be solved
to the spe·
cilk facts a correct
of wlJat cousi rtutes a cause
of ndion. A cause of action is the
to secnrc redress for
yiolation of an obligation
to the claimant. Iu ](lop.
stock v. Sttperior Conrt, supra, 17 Cal.2d
at page 20: 'In
whether a
different cause of aetion is
inlrocluced by the amendment teehnieal considerations or
aneic'nt formulae are not
more is meant
tlmu that the defendant not be
to <m::m-er a wholly
di'Terent legal liability or
from that originally
stn
As the court says iu the Frost ease
p. 426),
for the purpose of determining whether ame11dment is posthe "cause of aetion" referred as to furnishing the
test means only the legal
which it is sought to
ell
against the defendant. Other eourts have used almost
iclentical language; the test is not >Yhethcr under technical
rules of pleading a new eause of action i,; int rodueed, but
the test is whether an
is made to state faets

L
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which
rise to a wholly distinct and different legal obligation against the defendant. The power to permit amendment is denied only if a change is made in the liability sought
to be enforced against the defendant. (See Harr1:ss v. Tams,
258 N.Y. 229, 242 [179 N.E. 476] .) ' Day v. Western Loan
& mdg. Co., 42 Cal.App.2d 226, 231 [108 P.2d 702] : 'It is
well-settled that, where the orig·inal complaint has been filed
within the statutory period, an amended complaint may be
filed after the statute has run as long as it does not state a
new or different cause of action from that appearing in the
original complaint. Stated another way, if the original
complaint defectively states a cause of action, it may be
amended after the running of the statute as long as the cause
of action stated in the amended pleading can trace its descent
from the original pleading.'
"Wennerholm v. Stanford University Seh. of Med., 20 Cal.
2d 713 [128 P.2d 522, 141 A.L.R. 1358], was an action against
manufacturers, distributors, and dispensers of certain drugs
for personal injuries caused by use of same. The first four
complaints charged negligence; the fifth amended complaint
shifted to fraud. Judgment sustaining demurrer thereto
without leave to amend was reversed. At page 717: 'The
ground of general demurrer principally urged by the defendants is that the cause of action is barred by the statute of
limitations. This contention is based on the theory that the
fifth amended complaint charging fraud states a new and
different cause of action from that for negligence stated in
the original complaint. Unless the amended complaint sets
forth an entirely different cause of action from the original,
however, the amended complaint, for the purposes of the
statute of limitations, must be deemed filed as of the date
of the original complaint. [Citing cases.] The modern rule,
where amendment is sought after the statute of limitations
has run, is that the amended complaint will be deemed filed
as of the date of the original complaint so long as recovery is
sought in each complaint upon the same general set of facts.
[Citing cases.] A mere change in legal theory will not subject the amended complaint to the bar of the statute of limitations. (Citing cases.] In the present case the only substantial
difference between the factual situation set forth in the original and the fifth amended complaint is that the former charged
that the representations were negligently made while the
latter charges that they were made with knowledge of their
falsity. Despite the change in legal theory from an action

513

it cannot be
that an
cause of
is stated. Therefore the
is not barred by the statute of limitations.'
the amendment at bar 'can trace its descent
v-~.J, 5 "~""'- pleading' and be said to involve the 'same
geru:u·•'n set
facts' as the
That docuwas a printed form
by the commission. At the
of the page in small capital letters it says
T'l'l'(ivnnoJ1~< of the '\Vorkmen's Compensation Insurance and
Laws,
applicant need only state the
nature
claim in controversy. . . . ' This the applicant did
he said 'Punch press broke so that it punched twice in
succession.' Of course, no charge of fault or negligence
necessary to or expected in such an application. When
attorney included in the 'reason for filing this
a statement that 'Claimant alleges that employer was
negligent in maintenance of the press' he served
that something more than compensation payable regardof fault would be sought. And the printed prayer 'That
an order or award made granting such relief as the party
or
may be entitled to' was broad enough to sustain
an award of increased compensation if perchance gross negliwould afford ground for such an award in point of
Obviously the application was defective but, fairly
liberally construed, it did give notice of a claim for
coiJape:nsfttio,n additional to the normal amount payable withIt was aimed, as were the later allegations of
misconduct, at increased compensation which was but
,,~,~.,,,u,ou" to, a part of the basic claim. (E. Clemens Horst
v. lndmtrial Ace. Com., S1tpra, 184 Cal. 180, 192-193.)
fact that it was inexpertly phrased does not deprive
it of all value as a basis for informed amendment. When
facts are the same a shifting from one theory of
to another is not the substitution of a new canse of
(Oberkotter v. Woolman, 187 Cat 500, 504 [202
; Wennerkolm v. StanfMd University Sck. of Med.,
20 CaL2d 713, 718; Barr v. Carroll, supra, 128 Cal.
.<UJ'IJ·"''u 23, 33-34.)
The absence of a vital allegation in an
complaint, resulting in the statement of no eanse
action at all, does not preclude an amendment to incorporate
indispensable element of the action. The correct view
well stated in 2 Witkin's California Procedure, section 606,
1619: 'If the original complaint fails to state a cause
because of defective pleading of the elements, it is in

dt>murrer
point i:-;
the formerly desame cause of action; there is no
nature of the case and therefore no surprise
to the defendant.
Rauer's Law etc. Co. v.
well ( 1909), 11
494, 495 [ 105 P. 427] ; Ruiz v.
Barbara Oas etc. Co. (1912), 164 Cal. 188, 194 [128
; Woods v. Cook (1936), 14 Cal.App.2d 560, 562 [58
,
§ 613.) ' Both original application and
amendment count upon an accident of June 10, 1953, occurat the premises of the employer Bowers Manufacturing
and resulting in loss of part of middle finger of
right hand and paralysis of index finger of right
hand. The gross negligence was alleged to relate to 'maintenance of the press,' and the wilful misconduct to the same
but more elaborately 'That on or about June lOth, 1953,
Bowers Mfg. Company operated and maintained a certain punch press in its place of manufacturing in
violation of section 3601 (b) 'l'itle 8, of the California Adminisgration Code, in thay all points of operation guards were
not properly set up, adjusted or maintained in safe and effieient
order.'
"EatweU v. Beck, 41 Cal.2d 128, 135-136 [257 P.2d 643],
affords a persuasive analogy. That was an action for deceit.
Of course, fraud without damage is not actionable at law
and such an averment is essential to a good complaint.
v. Ji'ishb~trn, 183 Cal. 206, 220 [190 P. 808]; Maynes
Mesa Lancl Co., 10 Cal.2d 587, 590 [76 P.2d 109];
12
§ 69, p. 813.) 'l'he exclusive measure of Eatwell's
recovery was his out-of-pocket loss under section 3343, Civil
Code ; he had alleged certain damage which was not recoverable ; confronted by motion for nonsuit he sought leave to
reopen and to amend his complaint to aver the proper clamages. 'l'his was denied and held to be erroneous. An amendment to incorporate a proper allegation was held to be
proper and indeed not to be denied. See also ruling of this
court in Srnith v. Los Angeles Bookbinders Union, 133 Cal.
App.2d
495 [284 P.2d 194].
'' 'l'his procedural liberality was applied to a compensation
ease in National Auto. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Corn.,
!15 Cal.App.2d 10 [212 P.2d 1]. In that instance the appli-
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"'n'"''''nlna which contention
court said: 'But
need be said about the claimed variance. The commisnot bound
strict rules of
record demonstrates
it was obvious that
<Jt::t•u"•CJu<a was
upon
of a ""'""A"''
as well as the claimed infection of the arm as the cause
It was petitioners' witnesses who
that
was caused by thrombophlebitis and not by the arm
and it was also petitioners' witnesses who
such condition was aggravated by overwork. Petitioners
not surprised by this theory. Although it would have
better practice to have moved to amend to conform to
the failure to do so was a mere
which does
not invalidate the award. (Lab. Code, § 5709.)'
l:tesp·on•ctellts rely heavily upon Peterson v. Indttstrial Ace.
81 Cal.App.2d 352 [183 P.2d 927], but we do not
it opposed in any respect to the views herein exIn that case the application gave no intimation of
claim other than normal compensation. At the u~""""'
referee saw that wilful misconduct was ""''""''"~"n
told counsel for claimant he would have to amend
order to make that claim, gave
to do and
s11~~~este:d : 'Additional Issue. 'Vas
caused
The
serious and wilful misconduct
"n''""'"'' also told counsel it would be necessary to file a
application and was told that that would be done.
was on December 4, 1941; after various
other delays the matter was
heard on
than four years later. No amended or
been filed until April
an order
uc•ouLLli" this 1946
to be an amendment
and an increased award was made on the
misconduct. In annulling it the court
that there was no claim on file which could form a
that an
amendment
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'would not suffice to raise the issue and that a written amendment filed more than four years after the accident came too
late. The court said at page 357: 'While a claim for both
sorts of benefits may well be included in a single application,
the language of section 5407 indicates an intention that
some definite step, other and different from the filing of a
general application, must be taken to raise an issue of wilful
misconduct, and that an application setting up only the
ordinary issues shall not be sufficient for that purpose. The
respondents contend that sections 4553 and 5407 contain no
provisions as to how such a proceeding for the raising of
such an issue shall be commenced, whereas sections 5500 and
5501 provide for the application on the ordinary issue. The
latter sections are contained in a chapter devoted to pleading
and it is nowhere stated therein that they relate only to
applications on the ordinary issues. Section 5500 states that
the application shall be in writing and shall state the general
nature of the controversy concerning compensation, or any
right or liability arising out of or incidental thereto. This
would seem to have been intended to apply to both of these
kinds of issue. In any event the original application here
merely set forth as the cause of the injury that a cave-in
resulted because the walls of the excavation were not properly
shored up. It also stated the only question presented as
being whether or not the applicant had entirely recovered or
had suffered permanent disability. That this was the only
issue raised was recognized by the referee at the first hearing
and concurred in by all parties. In our opinion, the application as originally filed was not sufficient to raise the willful
misconduct issue.' And at 359 : 'The hearing leading to the
award here in question was then held, based on the new
application thus deemed to be an amendment to the original
application, on the theory that it related back to the date
of filing the original application. While there is, and should
be, great liberality in the matter of amendments this amendment in 1946, bringing in a new and different issue which
must be separately "commenced," could not relate back and
be effective as of a date in 1941, in the face of the clear
provisions of section 5407 of the Labor Code. While considerable informality in proceedings before the commission is
permitted, and properly so, the meaning and effect of these
statutory provisions cannot be entirely set aside, and some
attempt must be made to comply with them and to raise
issues in the manner and within the time there provided. We
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in
award 'Which is here m
' The case did not deal with our
and is not
commission's reliance npon its rule 10700
tit. 8, § 10700) is of no avail. It sets
for a
of serious and wilful misin an application, concluding as follows:
Failstate tho basis of the claim of serious and wilful
with the particularities herein provided, unless
waived by the adverse partie::;, may be grounds
eontinuanee.' Continuance of hearing, nut dismissal, is
for failure to plead wilful misconduct with the
required by the rule.''
foregoing reasons I would annul 'the order.
Petitioner's application for a rehearing by the Supreme
Court was denied ,June 12, 1956. Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., and
J., ·were of the opinion that the application should
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May 22, 1956.]

BENE:B'ICIAL FIRE ~1\.ND C~I\.SUALTY INSUHANCE
COMPANY (a Corporation), Respondent, v. KUR'l'
III'rKE AND COMPANY, INC. (a Corporation), Appellant.
[1] Insurance-Agency for Insurer-Actions-Offer of Proof.-an action by an insurance company against a general
for declaration of rights under a written contract relatto the agent's compensation, where the trial court had
previously indicated that it would receive no extrinsic evidence of any kind bearing on construction of the contract,
defendant's offer of proof that the parties construed the contract to mean that sums paid monthly to defendant were fully
that plaintiff never demanded a return of such sums
they showed in a deficit position, and that under trade
custom and usage earned commissions are never returnable,
sufficient, though general and somewhat vague.
lYicK. Dig. References: [1, 3] Insurance, § 33; [2] Appeal and
Error, § 184; [4] Evidence, § 414; [5] Evidence, § 399; [6] Evi§ 410; [7] Contracts, § 161; [8] Usages and Customs, § 6.

